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What inflation rate should the central bank target? We address determinacy issues related to this question 
in a two-sector model in which prices can differ in equilibrium. We assume that the degree of nominal 
price stickiness can vary across the sectors and that labor is immobile. The contribution of this paper is to 
demonstrate that a modified Taylor Principle holds in this environment. If the central bank elects to target 
sector one, and if it responds with a coefficient greater than unity to price movements in this sector, then 
this policy rule will ensure determinacy across all sectors. The results of this paper have at least two 
implications. First, the equilibrium-determinacy criterion does not imply a preference to any particular 
measure of inflation. Second, since the Taylor Principle applies at the sectoral level, there is no need for 
a Taylor Principle at the aggregate level. 
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Since at least Taylor (1993) it has been commonplace to think of monetary policy in
terms of directives for the nominal interest rate.  The “Taylor Rule” posits that the central bank
moves its interest rate instrument in reaction to movements in inflation and output.  The recent
literature on Taylor rules is voluminous.  See Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999) for a survey.
One branch of this literature is concerned with the issue of equilibrium determinacy: what
Taylor Rule coefficients ensure uniqueness of the equilibrium?  The problem is that following a
rule in which the central bank responds to endogenous variables may introduce real
indeterminacy and sunspot equilibria into an otherwise determinate economy.
1  These sunspot
fluctuations are welfare-reducing and can potentially be quite large.  The policy conclusion of
this literature is that a benevolent central banker should only use a Taylor Rule that ensures
determinacy of equilibrium.
2  A familiar result is that a necessary condition to ensure
determinacy is that the central bank’s response to inflation must be at least unity, i.e., a one
percentage point increase in the inflation rate should lead to a greater than one percentage point
increase in the nominal interest rate.
3  This has been called the “Taylor Principle.”
There are numerous operational issues that arise when implementing the Taylor Principle.
For example, should the central bank base its policy on forecasts of inflation, or actual realized
rates of inflation?  That is, should the central bank look forward or backward?  In an aggregative
model with cash-in-advance timing similar to that analyzed here, and including capital,
                                                          
1 It should also be recalled that sunspot equilibria are endemic if the interest rate is set to react to exogenous shocks
only (Woodford, 1999).
2 Since studies generally indicate that the welfare advantages of a first-best policy rule are quite small, it is doubly
important that a central banker “do no harm” and not follow a policy rule that may introduce sunspot fluctuations
into the economy.
3 Kerr and King (1996) and Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000) were the first to derive this result in a model similar to
that analyzed here.  Leeper (1991) has a related discussion.3
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) demonstrate that a backward-looking rule is necessary and sufficient
for determinacy.
A second operational issue is what inflation rate should be targeted.  The entire consumer
price index (CPI)?  The CPI stripped of food and energy prices?  The median CPI?   The
fundamental contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that a modified Taylor Principle holds.
If the central bank elects to target a subset of goods in the economy, and if it responds with a
coefficient greater than unity to past price movements of these goods, then this policy rule will
ensure price level determinacy across all sectors.
4  The key assumption driving this result is that
households purchase goods made in all sectors so that households, and thus all sectors’ firms,
care about relative prices.  Determinacy of the price level in one sector implies price determinacy
in other sectors through this relative price mechanism.
This paper therefore confirms and refines an idea that dates back to at least Patinkin
(1965). "In brief, a necessary condition for the determinacy of the absolute price level ... is that
the central bank concern itself with some money value…” (Chapter 12, Section 6). What is
important for determinacy is that the central bank cares enough about, in the sense of being
willing to respond forcefully enough to, movements in some nominal anchor.  Exactly which
nominal price it cares about does not really matter.  What does matter is that it cares about some
nominal price.  This price may be anything, from the price of gold to core-CPI.
5
There are at least two implications of the results of this paper.  First, the equilibrium-
determinacy criterion does not imply a preference to any particular measure of inflation.  The
                                                          
4 In this paper, we interpret “targeting” as “reacting to.” This is different from Svensson’s (2002) definition of
targeting, which refers to variables that are included in the central bank’s loss function.
5 We thank Peter Ireland for pointing this out to us.  It can also be shown that this nominal anchor need not be a
nominal price but may also be nominal money growth.4
choice of which inflation rate to target can be made on other grounds.
6  Second, since the Taylor
Principle applies at the sectoral level, there is no need for a Taylor Principle at the aggregate
level.  For example, suppose that the central bank targets inflation in a specific sector of the
economy with a Taylor coefficient of τ  > 1, but that the econometrician estimates a Taylor rule
using the total CPI.  Depending upon the variances and covariances of shocks across the sectors,
the estimated Taylor coefficient could be much less than unity.  Hence, we cannot conclude that
the Taylor Principle is violated by simply looking at aggregate CPI numbers.
A corollary of the first implication above is that, in a currency union such as the euro-
zone, the European Central Bank (ECB) will be able to ensure determinacy of the economy even
by reacting to inflation in only a subset of countries.  For example, P. Benigno (2001) considers
inflation targeting policies in which the central bank of a currency area stabilizes a weighted-
average of the inflation rates of two different countries.  He demonstrates that it is optimal to
attach more weight to inflation in countries with higher degrees of nominal rigidity.  Benigno
does not address how such a policy could be operationalized.  To the extent that this is achieved
through a Taylor-type interest rate rule, our results can be used to analyze whether his optimal
policy is determinate.  This is important since Benigno does not address this question.
In analyzing determinacy, we adopt a framework that shares important features with P.
Benigno’s (2001) two-country, currency area model.  First, we consider two different sectors and
allow for the prices in these sectors to differ in equilibrium.  We assume that the degree of
nominal price stickiness can vary across the sectors.  Second, we assume that labor is immobile
across the two sectors.  This extreme assumption makes it more difficult to generate determinacy
as labor flows are not available to mitigate price differences.  In short, we set up the model so
                                                          
6 For example, a trimmed-mean CPI is a better predictor of the future CPI than is the CPI itself.5
that it is difficult to generate determinacy under a rule in which the central bank targets inflation
in only one sector.  This is important given the international implications of our results.
The paper proceeds as follows.  The next section develops the model.  Section 3 lays out
the basic determinacy results, and Section 4 concludes.
2. The Model
Our model is a two-sector version of the standard New-Keynesian setup used in the recent
literature on monetary policy.  We limit our discussion to a perfect foresight model as our focus
is on equilibrium determinacy.  We first describe the behavior of households and firms,
respectively, and then turn to the linearized system that will be the focus of our analysis.
2.A. The Representative Household
The economy is populated by a continuum of households between 0 and 1. The
representative household consists of two agents. One of these supplies labor to firms in sector 1,
the other supplies labor to firms in sector 2. These agents jointly maximize an intertemporal
utility function that depends on the household’s consumption of a basket of goods Ct, on the
household’s holdings of real money balances  t t P A  (where At is nominal money holdings and Pt
is the CPI), and on the disutility of the two agents from supplying labor in sectors 1 and 2, 
1
t L  and
2
t L , respectively:
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For simplicity, we assume:6
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The consumption basket C is a CES aggregate of sub-baskets of individual goods produced in
sectors 1 and 2:




















t t t C b C b C ω  > 0, 1 > b > 0. (3)
Sectors 1 and 2 are populated by monopolistically competitive firms, which produce
differentiated brands of the sectors’ goods. Sector 1 consists of firms in the interval between 0
and b; sector 2 consists of firms between b and 1. The sectoral consumption sub-baskets are:
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Given the consumption index in (3), the CPI equals:
() () () []
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where 
1
t P  and 
2
t P  are the price sub-indexes for sectors 1 and 2, respectively:
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and  () z P
j
t  denotes the price of individual brand z produced in sector j, j = 1, 2.
Given these price indexes, the household allocates its consumption to individual brands





























= , j = 1, 2. (7)7
Since our focus is on symmetric equilibria within each sector we henceforth drop the firm-
specific index z, and instead consider a representative firm in each sector j = 1,2.
The representative household enters the period with Mt cash balances and Bt – 1 holdings
of nominal bonds. At the beginning of the period, the household visits the financial market,
where is carries out bond trading and receives a monetary transfer Xt from the monetary
authority. The two agents then split and offer labor in sectors 1 and 2. They meet on the way
home from work and go shopping for consumption goods. Before entering the goods market, the
household has cash holdings  t t t t t B B R X M − + + − − 1 1 , where Rt – 1 is the gross nominal interest
rate between t – 1 and t. Agents receive their nominal wage bills 
1 1
t t L W  and 
2 2
t t L W  in the mail at
the end of the period. Thus, after engaging in goods trading and opening the mail, the household
ends the period with cash balances given by the budget constraint:
t t t t t t t t t t t t C P B L W L W B R X M M − − + + + + = − − +
2 2 1 1
1 1 1 .( 8 )
We assume that the money balances that enter the utility function (those that matter for time-t
transactions) are those with which the household enters the time-t goods market, i.e., cash held in
advance of goods market trading. This is the cash-in-advance (CIA) timing of Carlstrom and
Fuerst (2001). Hence:
7
t t t t t t B B R X M A − + + = − − 1 1 .( 9 )
Bond-pricing and money demand equations are as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001):
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7 Under the traditional cash-when-I-am-done (CWID) timing of money-in-the-utility-function models, it is:
t t t t t t t t t t t t t C P B L W L W B R X M M A − − + + + + = = − − +
2 2 1 1
1 1 1 .8
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where UC(t) denotes the marginal utility of consumption at time t and Um(t) is the marginal utility
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where  () t U
L
1 −  ( () t U
L
2 − ) is the marginal disutility of supplying labor to sector 1 (2) firms. We
allow for the possibility that real wages in sectors 1 and 2 differ because of labor immobility.
2.B. Firms
Sectors 1 and 2 are populated by monopolistically competitive firms that produce
differentiated varieties of the goods in each sector. Price setting in sectors 1 and 2 is subject to
Calvo-Yun type nominal rigidity.  Given the standard nature of the environment we only sketch a
description of firm behavior.   Recall that since our focus is on symmetric equilibria we will
consider the behavior of a representative firm in each sector.
                                                          

















β .  Therefore, it is easy to verify that a backward-looking interest rate rule with CIA-timing is
equivalent to a current-looking rule with CWID-timing.9




t L Y = , j = 1, 2, (15)
where 
j
t Y  and 
j
t L  are the typical firm’s output and labor demand in sector j.  Firms in each sector
j = 1, 2, face the downward-sloping demand schedule (7).
Firms choose the amount of labor to be employed and the price of their output to















= j = 1, 2, (16)
where Z
j is marginal cost in sector j, so that (1/Z
j) is the markup of price over marginal cost,
identical across firms in each sector.  Equation (16) follows from either a Calvo-Yun type setup
for price stickiness
9 or a quadratic cost of price adjustment as in Rotemberg (1982).  Yun (1996)
provides the details that link the behavior of marginal cost in each sector to price growth in each
sector.  For simplicity we omit these details, but simply state the log-linearized version below
(equation (23)).
2.C. The Log-Linearized System and Equilibrium
There is a unique steady state to this model.  As our focus is on local determinacy
questions, we log-linearize the equilibrium conditions around this steady state.  Lower-case
letters denote percentage deviations from steady-state levels (
j
t w  is the log deviation of the real
                                                          
9 Calvo (1983), Yun (1996).10
wage  t
j
t P W ).  When interest and inflation rates are concerned, we consider percentage
deviations of gross rates from the respective steady-state levels.
Household behavior is defined by the labor supply equations (13)-(14), the Fisher




t c l = these





t c c w + =   j = 1, 2. (17)
, 1 1 1 + + + − = − t t t t r c c π (18)




t c p p c + − − = ω   j = 1, 2. (19)
From (5), the CPI is linked to the sectoral prices via
(), 1
2 1
t t t p b bp p − + = (20)
and prices and inflation are linked by




t p ∆ = π   j = 1, 2, (21)
where ∆  denotes first differences (∆ xxx tt t ≡− − 1 for any variable x).







t p p w z − + =   j = 1, 2. (22)
From Yun (1996), we have the familiar New-Keynesian Phillips curve:
10





j z =+ + 1,  j = 1, 2, (23)
where λ
j > 0 measures the degree of nominal rigidity in sector j. We allow sectors to differ in the
extent to which prices are sticky.
                                                          
10 See Yun (1996) for the Calvo-Yun setup, or Roberts (1995) for the quadratic cost adjustment scenario.11
To close the model we need to define monetary policy.  We specify monetary policy as a
Taylor rule in which the nominal interest rate is a function of lagged inflation.  We choose this
backward-looking rule because current and forecast-based rules are typically prone to sunspot
equilibria in this modeling environment.
11  We consider two alternatives for the rate of inflation
to which the central bank is reacting. In the first case, the central bank reacts to CPI inflation:
, 1 − = t t r τπ   τ  > 0. (24)
In the second case, the central bank reacts to inflation in sector 1 only:
,
1
1 − = t t r τπ  τ  > 0. (25)
In what follows we will call (24) the “CPI Taylor Rule” and (25) the “Sectoral Taylor Rule.”










t p c w z , , , , π , for j = 1, 2, and the three aggregate variables pt, π t, and ct, that satisfy the
thirteen restrictions in (17)-(23) and (24) or (25).
3. Equilibrium Determinacy
We now proceed to the issue of determinacy.  We proceed in two steps.  First, we
examine the case of perfect labor mobility.  This case is easily dealt with.  Second, we turn to the
more interesting case of no labor mobility.  A key conclusion is that even in this environment,
with such an extreme real rigidity, targeting inflation in one sector is sufficient for price level
determinacy across all sectors.
                                                          
11 Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) demonstrate that an aggressive backward-looking rule (τ  > 1) is necessary and
sufficient for determinacy in a model that includes capital accumulation.12
3.A. Determinacy with Labor Mobility
Let us begin the analysis with a special case of the model in which labor is
instantaneously mobile across sectors so that 
2 1
t t w w =  for all t.  In this case, equations (17)-(19)
imply that  t t t c c c = =
2 1  and  t t t p p p = =
2 1 , and equations (17) and (22) imply that  t t t c w z 2 = = .
The two sectors collapse into one, and we are left with a system solely in aggregates:
, 1 1 1 + + + − = − t t t t r c c π (26)
1 2 + + = t t t c βπ λ π , (27)
 where
2 1 ) 1 ( λ λ λ b b − + =  is the weighted average of λ
j across sectors.  Since  t t t π π π = =
2 1 , it is
irrelevant whether the central bank targets price inflation in sector 1 (equation (25)) or aggregate
inflation (equation (24)).  The determinacy conditions for this model are identical to the
aggregate model studied in, for example, Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001).  We have determinacy if
and only if τ  > 1.
Proposition  1.  Assume that the two sectors are characterized by perfect labor mobility but
potentially different degrees of price rigidity.  Then τ  > 1 is a necessary and sufficient condition
for determinacy under the CPI Taylor Rule  1 − = t t r τπ and the Sectoral Taylor Rule 
1
1 − = t t r τπ .
3.B. Determinacy without Labor Mobility
Suppose that real wages need never equal because labor cannot flow across sectors.  One
would anticipate that this extreme real rigidity would make it difficult to achieve equilibrium
determinacy if the central bank only targets one sector.  We begin by assuming that the two13
sectors are characterized by identical degrees of nominal rigidity (λλλ
12 == ).  We then
conclude with the more general case.
To analyze determinacy, it is convenient to define aggregate variables and differences as
follows. Given sectoral levels of variables x
1 and x
2, the aggregate level is  () xb x b x ≡+ −
12 1.
We let x
D denote the difference between sectors 1 and 2: xx x
D ≡−
12 . Determinacy of
aggregates and differences implies determinacy at the individual sector level since
() xx b x
D 1 1 =+−  and xx b x
D 2 =− .  We will exploit this fact in what follows.
With perfect labor mobility the key finding was that the prices between the two sectors
had to be equal  t t t p p p = =
2 1  irrespective of the policy rule.  This immediately implied that it
made no difference whether the central bank targeted one or both sectors.  Without labor mobility
these two prices may no longer be equal.  Despite this, however, we demonstrate that there is
determinacy of relative prices regardless of the policy rule.  This will then enable us to turn to the
issue of aggregate determinacy and show that we have determinacy for either the CPI Taylor
Rule or the Sectoral Taylor Rule as long as τ  > 1.
3.B.1. Determinacy of Relative Prices
Given identical degrees of nominal rigidity (λλλ
12 == ) the dynamics of the cross-
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t p z ) 1 ( + − = ω . (29)14
Relationship (29) is key.  In fact, without sticky prices  0 = =
D
t t z z  so that prices in the two
sectors are again equal and thus the CPI- and Sectoral-Taylor Rules are the same.
With sticky prices, since households purchase goods in both sectors there is a link
between relative prices, and thus marginal costs, in each sector.  Because this cross-sector link is
negative, relative prices are always pinned.  A high price in sector 1 implies a low demand for
sector 1’s good.  This in turn leads to: a low demand for sector 1 labor; a low wage in sector 1;
and thus a low marginal cost in sector 1.  This negative cross-sector link is opposite the positive
link implied by the Phillips curve (28).  This incompatibility eliminates the possibility of self-
fulfilling behavior in relative prices and thus generates determinacy of relative prices.
We will now demonstrate this formally by exploiting the link in (29).  Since the Phillips
curve is in terms of 
D
t π , but (29) need not hold at time  1 − t , we first consider determinacy from
the vantage point of time  1 + t .
12  We then use the restrictions implied by this dynamic equation
to see whether relative marginal cost, and hence relative prices, are determined once we take into
account the extra time-t restriction implied by (28) and (29).  Scrolling (29) forward and writing
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or






t z z z β ω λ β . (32)
                                                          
12 If the economy starts at time t, there is no condition (29) for time t - 1.15
The characteristic polynomial of equation (32) has one root inside and one root outside the unit
circle.  This implies that
D
t z 1 +  is a unique function of 
D
t z , so that 
D
t z 1 + ∆  and, from equation (30),
D
t 1 + π  are also unique functions of 
D
t z .  Using this knowledge, we return to the time-t restrictions.












t z 1 1 + + = π π , we are left
with:










t z z p z + − + = − + − βπ λ ω .
Thus, 
D
t z  is determined from above and, from (29), 
D
t p  is also determined.  Hence, we have
determinacy of price level differences (relative prices) across sectors.
3.B.2. Determinacy of Aggregates
We will now turn to the behavior of the aggregates.  There are two cases here depending
upon the form of the Taylor rule.
Case 1. The CPI Taylor Rule
Suppose the central bank reacts to CPI inflation as in (24). Aggregating inflation across
sectors yields:
1 + + = t t t z βπ λ π . (33)
wz tt = . (34)
t t c w 2 = . (35)
Hence, our system is the familiar
, 1 1 1 + + + − = − t t t t r c c π (36)16
1 2 + + = t t t c βπ λ π . (37)
This is identical to (26)-(27) so that we have determinacy of aggregates if and only if τ  > 1.
Case 2. The Sectoral Taylor Rule
Suppose that the central bank sets the interest rate according to rule (25).  Recall that the
nature of monetary policy (in particular, the inflation rate to which the central bank reacts) was
irrelevant for the argument surrounding determinacy of differences across sectors.  This will be
key in what follows.
Equations (36)-(37) hold also when the central bank reacts to sector 1 inflation only. Note
that inflation in sector 1 can be written as  () ππ π tt t
D b
1 1 =+ − , where we already know that the
inflation differential is determinate. Hence, equation (36) becomes:
() . 1 1 1 + + − − + = − t
D
t t t t b c c π π τ τπ (38)
Our system is thus (37)-(38).  But since 
D
t π  is determinate regardless of the policy rule, we are
left with the familiar determinacy condition τ  > 1.
This result is quite general and powerful.  Since relative prices were pinned independent
of the policy rule chosen, the determinacy conditions for sectoral and Taylor rules will be
identical if the monetary authority reacts to any aggregate variable in addition to
sectoral/aggregate-inflation.  
Proposition 2. Suppose that the two sectors are characterized by zero labor mobility but identical
degrees of nominal rigidity.  Then τ  > 1 is a necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy
under the CPI Taylor Rule  1 − = t t r τπ  and the Sectoral Taylor Rule 
1
1 − = t t r τπ .17
We have shown that the Taylor principle (τ  > 1) is a necessary and sufficient condition
for determinacy in a two-sector economy with identical degrees of nominal rigidity across sectors
regardless of labor mobility and, more importantly, regardless of whether the central bank is
reacting to aggregate CPI inflation or inflation in one sector only. Note that the latter result holds
irrespective of the value of b, the share of sector 1 in the consumption basket. Even if b were
extremely small, a more than proportional reaction of the nominal interest rate to past inflation in
sector 1 would be sufficient to ensure determinacy, regardless of labor mobility.
As we mentioned above, the intuition for this result revolves around equation (29).
Households purchase goods in both sectors so that they respond to relative prices.  Households
also supply labor to both sectors.  A low relative price implies a high relative demand for the
product, and thus a high wage and marginal cost in that sector.  This negative link between prices
and marginal cost across sectors is opposite the firm’s desire to have prices increasing in
marginal cost.  This general equilibrium tension in relative pricing results in relative price
determinacy.  But once relative prices are determined we need only consider aggregate behavior
and we are quickly led to the familiar Taylor Principle of τ  > 1.   This conclusion is quite robust:
In the next proposition, we establish the general result that τ  > 1 ensures determinacy of the two-
sector economy even when the degrees of nominal rigidity differ across sectors.
Proposition 3.  Suppose that the two sectors are characterized by zero labor mobility and
different degrees of nominal rigidity.  Then τ  > 1 is a necessary and sufficient condition for
determinacy under the CPI Taylor Rule  1 − = t t r τπ and the Sectoral Taylor Rule 
1
1 − = t t r τπ .18
Proof:  See the Appendix.
4. Conclusion
A well-known result in the recent work on central bank interest rate policies is the Taylor
Principle: to ensure equilibrium determinacy, the central bank must respond aggressively (τ  > 1)
to movements in inflation.  This result comes from an aggregative sticky-price model. The
contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that a modified Taylor Principle holds in a multi-
sector economy in which the sectors differ by the degree of price stickiness irrespective of
whether labor is mobile between the two sectors.  In particular, it does not matter what price
index the central bank targets—the median CPI, core CPI, or the entire CPI—an aggressive
response to any one of these price indexes is sufficient for determinacy.
Another interesting question on which this paper may help shed light is whether it matters
in an open-economy set up if central banks target tradable goods, non-tradable goods, or the
entire CPI inflation.  Benigno and Benigno (2001) show that the Taylor principle holds in a
model with flexible exchange rates, purchasing power parity, and Taylor-type policy rules where
the central banks react to the inflation rate of domestic products only.  This paper suggests that it
does not matter which price level the central bank of an open economy targets.  Relative price
adjustments should ensure determinacy given a properly aggressive reaction to any of the
inflation rates above even if labor is completely immobile between countries.  Work in progress
is presently trying to verify this hunch.
We conclude with an example that will illustrate the empirical relevance of our
theoretical result.  Kozicki (1999) provides estimates of backward-looking Taylor rules over the19
period 1983-97.
13  Using CPI inflation as the measure of inflation she estimates τ  = .88.  This is a
violation of the Taylor Principle suggesting that the economy over that period could be subject to
sunspots.  However, Kozicki also estimates a Taylor rule for this same period, where the central
bank responds to core CPI inflation instead—a narrower measure of inflation.  This estimate was
τ  = 1.28, indicating that sunspots would not be a problem over this time period.  In general, her
results suggest that the U.S. central bank responds to core CPI inflation and not total CPI.  This
may have important implications for papers such as that by Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000),
who estimate whether sunspots are a potential problem for certain sub-periods in U.S. history.
                                                          
13 Kozicki also includes a measure of the output gap in her estimation, but this is irrelevant for the issue at hand
because the central bank’s reaction to the output gap has a negligible effect on the determinacy conditions (the
corresponding determinacy condition is  () ( ) 0 1 1 2 > − + − γ β τ λ , where γ  is the coefficient on the output gap).
The numbers we report are from her Table 3 with the Taylor measure of the output gap.  A similar result arises for
the IMF and DRI measures of the output gap.20
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6. Appendix
Proposition 3.  Suppose that the two sectors are characterized by zero labor mobility and
different degrees of nominal rigidity.  Then τ  > 1 is a necessary and sufficient condition for
determinacy under the CPI Taylor Rule  1 − = t t r τπ  and the Sectoral Taylor Rule 
1
1 − = t t r τπ .
Proof.  (We consider the case of the Sectoral Taylor Rule.  The proof in the case of the CPI
Taylor Rule is symmetric.)  To begin, we collapse the system (17)-(23) into a system solely in
terms of the sectoral prices.  First, eliminate 
j
t w and 
j
t c  by substituting (17) and (19) into (22):




t t p p z c − + + = ω ,  j = 1, 2. (39)
Using one of these two expressions we can eliminate ct from the system, and then use the two
Phillips curves (23) to eliminate 
j
t z .  The aggregate price level can be eliminated with the use of
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where  . 0
1
1 A A A
− =
Our interest is in the roots of A.  One root is always unity as we are writing the system in
price levels (in difference form we have inflation rates). The characteristic equation of the
remaining system is proportional to a fourth-order polynomial, J(q).  For determinacy, three roots
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1 1 − + = τ λ λ ω J ,
) 2 1 ( 2 2 1 0 τ λ λ λ + − = J ,
with J4 < 0, J3 > 0, J2 < 0, J1 > (<) 0 if τ  > (<) 1, and J0 < 0.  Note that J4 and J3 do not depend
upon the key policy parameter τ .  Its easy to show that J(0) < 0, J’(0) > 0, J”(0) < 0, and J’’’(0) >
0.  Hence, all the roots of J have positive real parts.  The product of the four roots is equal to
J0/J4 > 1.  Furthermore J(1) has the sign of () 1 − τ .  Therefore, if τ  < 1, there are either 0 or 2
roots in (0, 1), so that we can never have determinacy.  Hence, τ  > 1 is necessary for determinacy.
We now turn to sufficiency.
Since J(1) > 0 for τ  > 1, we know that J has (at least) two real roots, one in the unit circle
and one outside.  Let us refer to these two real roots as e1 < 1 and e2 > 1. Our task is to examine
the remaining two roots of J and demonstrate that they are outside the unit circle if τ  > 1.
The proof proceeds in three steps.  First, we show that these two remaining roots are real and
outside the unit circle for τ  = 1 + ε , where  0 > ε  and ε  is arbitrarily small.  Therefore, we have
determinacy for τ  slightly greater than one.  The second step, which is part of the case when the
two roots are real, demonstrates that, as long as these two roots stay real, they must remain
outside the unit circle for larger values of τ .  Finally, we turn to the case when these two roots are
complex and show that, once their norm is outside the unit circle, it must stay there.  The first
two steps of the proof ensure that, once the roots become complex, they are outside the unit25
circle.  The last step guarantees that if they ever become real again they will once again be
outside the unit circle.
Case 1.  The two remaining roots are real
We first demonstrate that, if these two remaining roots are real, then J must have three
roots outside the unit circle.
Define the function h(y) ≡  J(q) where  1 − = q y .  The function h is also a quartic with
coefficients h0, h1, h2, h3, and h4.  Note that h0 = J(1), h1 = J’(1), h2 = J”(1)/2, h3 = J’’’(1)/3!, etc.
Inspection of the J function implies that h0 > 0, h3 > 0 and h4 < 0.  Descartes’ Rule of Signs
implies that there is indeterminacy if and only if h1>0 and h2>0.  In the neighborhood of τ  = 1,
both J’(1) and J”(1), however, cannot be greater than or equal to zero (assuming  2 1 > β ) since
. 0 ) 1 | 1 ( ' ' ) 1 ( ) 1 | 1 ( ' ) 1 2 ( < = − + = − τ β τ β J J   This then implies that h(y) (J(q)) has three roots
greater than zero (unity).  Hence, we have determinacy for τ  just slightly greater than unity.
As long as these two roots remain real, they must remain outside the unit circle for larger
values of τ .  This is true because J(0) < 0 and J(1) > 0 for all τ  > 0, so that the only way for there
to be indeterminacy is to have three roots within the unit circle.  This can never be the case
without the roots first becoming complex. Therefore, as we increase τ  out of the neighborhood 1
+ ε , we must continue to have exactly one root in the unit circle.
We next show that the two remaining roots must be real for τ  just slightly greater than
unity.  Recall that J(0) < 0 and J(1) = 0 for τ   = 1.  If the two remaining roots are complex, then J
must have a double real root at q = 1 when τ   = 1.  Furthermore, since J(1) > 0 for τ   > 1, J must26
be complex at q = 1.  But we demonstrated earlier that both J’(1) and J”(1) cannot be non-
negative. Hence, the two remaining roots must be real.
Once the roots become complex, they are determinate.  We show below that, once these
two roots become complex, they must stay outside the unit circle.   This then implies that, even if
they become real again, they will be determinate.
Case 2. The remaining roots are complex
The problem with the above proof is that, as τ  increases, the remaining two roots may
become complex.  Define
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) bi a q bi a q e q e q q G + − − − − − ≡ 2 1 ,
where the two complex roots are () bi a +  and () bi a − .  Let  ( )
2 2 b a x + ≡  denote the norm of
these two roots.  We calculate  () () τ τ τ d da b d db a d dx + =  as follows. Expanding G, we end up
with coefficients G3, G2, G1, and G0, with  4 3 3 J J G = ,  4 2 2 J J G = ,  4 1 1 J J G = , and



















































































































































Evaluating  τ d dx  at x = 1, it can be shown that  τ d dx  > 0, i.e., if the complex roots get to the
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